Authors: Flavio Toffalini, Mariano Graziano, Mauro Conti, Jianying Zhou
Abstract: Intel Software Guard eXtension (SGX) is a technology to create enclaves (i.e., trusted memory regions) hardware isolated from a compromised operating system. Recently, researchers showed that unprivileged adversaries can mount code-reuse attacks to steal secrets from enclaves. However, modern operating systems can use memory-forensic techniques to detect their traces. To this end, we propose SnakeGX, an approach that allows stealthier attacks with a minimal footprint; SnakeGX is a framework to implant a persistent backdoor in legitimate enclaves. Our solution encompasses a new architecture specifically designed to overcome the challenges SGX environments pose, while preserving their integrity and functionality. We thoroughly evaluate SnakeGX against StealthDB, which demonstrates the feasibility of our approach.